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BLOOD, POWER, AND HYPOCRISY: 
THE MURDER OF ROBERT IMBRIE AND 
AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH PAHLAVI IRAN, 1924 
I'm never looking for trouble, but if it comes I'll welcome it with open arms. 
Robert W. Imbrie, Petrograd, 1918 
Imbrie was a personal friend of mine. 
Allen W. Dulles, February 12, 1926 
A MURDER OF CONSEQUENCE 
On Friday, July 18, 1924, Robert W. Imbrie, United States Consul in Tehran-
and personal friend and special agent of Allen W. Dulles, Chief of the State 
Department's Near Eastern Affairs Division-was brutally killed. Imbrie was 
beaten to death by a mob led by members of the Muslim clergy and including 
many members of the Iranian Army. In the weeks preceding July 18, there had 
been several outbreaks of anti-Bahai violence. Imbrie and Melvin SeYq10ur ha<;l 
gone that morning to investigate a miraculous watering place in central Tehran 
that figured in the anti-Bahai excitement. According to contemporary accounts, 
a Bahai had been struck blind after drinking from the source when he refused to 
make an offering in the name of the Shici saints; his sight miraculously had been 
restored after he had repented and made the donation. I 
Imbrie's motive for visiting the shrine (saqqa-khaneh) has never been clear. 
Presumably he was investigating in his capacity as consul. However, he took a 
camera along to take photographs for the National Geographic Society, and the 
camera was cited by the Iranian government as a cause of what subsequently 
occurred. Imbrie seems to have expected trouble. He brought Seymour, an 
oilfield roughne~k who had been imprisoned by the Consulate for repeatedly 
bludgeoning his foreman, with him as a bodyguard.2 
After Imbrie had taken photographs of people at the watering place, Imbrie 
and Seymour were identified as Bahais by a: 17-year-old mullah, Sayyid Husain, 
who accused them of having poisoned the source. The crowd attacked Imbrie, 
who continued to take pictures, and Seymour, who wielded Imbrie's "shillelagh." 
(The word was Seymour's; the State Department identified the device as a 
blackjack.) Unharmed, the Americans momentarily escaped in their carriage.3 
The mob caught up with them when the carriage was detained by a policeman 
outside the main barracks of the Pah1avi regiment of the Cossack Brigade, the 
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most important military force in Iran. Prime Minister Reza Khan Pahlavi Was 
the Cossack commander. Here the crowd was joined by many soldiers, who 
pulled Imbrie to the street and beat him. Seymour was attacked on the Cossack 
parade ground. Despite the presence of many police officers-the main Tehran 
police headquarters was across the street-both Imbrie and Seymour were very 
seriously injured before they were finally rescued by the police. In explanation of 
their timidity, police officials later admitted that they were afraid of the Cossacks, 
who were the real authority in Tehran, and that they were under orders not to 
interfere in anti-Bah'ai disturbances. There were about 2,000 rioters.4 
Imbrie and Seymour were attacked a third time as they lay helpless in a 
hospital inside the police headquarters. Seymour survived, perhaps because he 
already looked dead. Mrs. Katherine Gillespie Imbrie preferred to believe that 
the mob passed him by because his naked body displayed "certain physical 
appearances [which] gave evidence that Seymour might be a Mohammedan."s 
Imbrie received fatal blows. None of the more than 130 wounds, caused mostly 
by stones, sticks, and paving tiles, was alone sufficient to cause death-including 
the saber cut that flayed Imbrie's scalp to the bone. His body could not 
withstand the shock, however, of what the attending physician described as "the 
most brutal assault that I have ever known." Conscious to the end, Imbrie 
expired about 3:00 P.M., about four hours after the attack began.6 
This murder was instrumental in Reza Khan's consolidation of power in Iran. 
In the view of tke British Military Attache, Colonel W. A. K. Fraser, "The event 
gave him ... the excuse for declaring martial law and a censorship of the 
Press .... Numerous arrests have been made, chiefly of political opponents of 
the Prime Minister.,,7 The American view was even stronger. According to 
Major Sherman Miles, a United States Army General Staff officer sent to Tehran 
to investigate, the murder was deliberate. Miles concluded that the anti-Bahai 
rioting in Tehran was intended by the Iranian government to end in the death of 
a foreigner. Reza Khan wanted a foreigner to die "so that he could declare 
martial law and check the power of the Mullahs.,,8 
IMBRIE'S CAREER 
The man who thus died was not an ordinary American diplomat; he was a 
spy-adventurer. Imbrie had trained for the law at George Washington and Yale 
Universities, but he had been bored by its practice. Mter escaping briefly to a 
Congo expedition in 1911, he joined the French Army as an ambulance driver 
when the Great War broke out. He served at Verdun and on the Salonika front 
before leaving in 1917 to join the American Foreign Service as a special consular 
agent in Petrograd.9 
In Russia he was loud and violent in defense of American interests. According 
to a New York Times account,10 he had beaten with his walking stick on the desk 
of Ouritsky, the Petrograd head of the Cheka (the Soviet secret police). He 
became a notorious anti-Bolshevik. He distinguished himself by acquiring for the 
State Department a set of documents, subsequently proven to be forgeries, that 
purported to demonstrate that the Bolshevik government took orders from 
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Berlin. After he was expelled from Soviet territory, he went to Viborg, Finland, 
in March 1919 to establish and operate "a reconnaissance service for investigation 
in Soviet Russia." He continued until June 1920, leaving after his Finnish cover 
was blown. II 
In 1920 the Department sent him to Istanbul, to work with General Wrangel's 
White Army in the Crimea. Before Imbrie arrived, however, Wrangel had been 
defeated and Imbrie was forced to remain in Istanbul, where he found little to 
occupy his time. His requests to be sent back to Finland or to Bessarabia to 
operate against the Soviets were denied.12 
Instead, he was assigned in February 1922 to be a special consular agent with 
the Turkish Nationalist forces in Arratolia. His mission was to establish American 
diplomatic and commercial influence, and "he succeeded in gaining the confidence 
and good will of the Angora [Ankara] leaders in an unusual measure," 
demonstrating "exceptional capacity for dealing with perplexing and perhaps 
dangerous situations in out of the way places." According to Admiral Colby M. 
Chester, "Mr. Imbrie did more to secure the success of thIS enterprise [the 
Chester Project] than any other official.,,!3 This success was achieved at the cost 
of offending grecophiles. 
In July 1923 Imbrie was recalled to Washington to answer charges/4 most 
notably that he had endangered the life of Louise Bryant, widow of John Reed 
and wife of William Bullitt, by denouncing her to the Turks as a Bolshevik. 15 
After cooling his heels for some time, he was assigned to Tabriz, Iran, to reopen 
a consulate and to establish an information network on the Soviet Union. 
Temporarily he was assigned to Tehran, to replace Consul Bernard Gotlieb, who 
was on home leave. 16 He had barely arrived when he was killed. 
The State Department understood that it was gambling when it sent Imbrie to 
Iran. "Of course in sending a man of Imbrie's rather impetuous disposition to far 
away countries we are taking a certain risk," wrote Allen Dulles, on September 
19, 1923. "The only question is as to whether the advantages to be gained would 
justify this risk. I am rather inclined to think they would.,,17 The gamble failed; 
Imbrie's impetuosity contributed to his death. 18 
Naturally, in view of his anti-Soviet background, the question of Communist 
complicity in the attack on Imbrie was raised. Despite accounts that the 
Bolsheviks had put a $40,000 (gold) price on his head, the State Department 
could find no evidence of Bolshevik culpability.19 All the evidence pointed solely 
to Iranian responsibility, abetted by Imbrie's bad judgment. 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT REACTION 
The official American reaction to Imbrie's murder was very harsh and very 
concerned to maintain U.S. prestige. The American government insisted on 
speedy prosecution, and it intervened in the process to ensure that individuals it 
believed to be guilty were punished. When the United States believed the Iranian 
court-martial to be whitewashing the military, the American Charge protested to 
the Iranian Foreign Minister, and Major Miles tongue-lashed the Iranian Prime 
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Minister. When the United States believed an Iranian informant to be in danger 
of reprisal, it intervened in his behalf.20 
As a result of these efforts, about 20 guilty verdicts were delivered. Three boys 
were condemned to death: Mortaza (age 19), a Cossack Private; cAli Reshti (age 
14), a civilian camel driver; and Sayyid Husain (age 17), a mullah who claimed 
descent from the Prophet. After delaying action until fall, the Iranian govern-
ment finally executed Mortaza-for breach of military discipline. The government 
then announced the commutation of cAli's and Husain's sentences to life in 
prison. U.S. protests, including a calculated display of bad temper by Dulles to 
the Iranian charge, succeeded in getting the death sentences reinstated. Both 
boys were shot in the presence of American government representatives. U.S. 
Charge Wallace Murray refused pleas for mercy.21 
In addition to insisting on blood punishment, the United States insisted that 
Iran pay blood money. Mrs. Imbrie was given $60,000 in compensation for the 
loss of her husband. She was not satisfied and for years tried to get additional 
funds. The State Department believed that $60,000 was appropriate, given its 
study of precedents, but Congress relented in 1926 and voted her an additional 
$25,000.22 
Seymour was given $3,000 in compensation for his injuries, an amount that 
barely covered his lost wages and transporation costs home. The State Depart-
ment refused to discuss any liability for his having been endangered by Consul 
Imbrie while in custody.23 
The U.S. Government received $110,000 in payment for some of its expenses 
in the transport of Imbrie's body to Washington by the U.S.S. Trenton, the 
newest ship in the American fleet. Charge Murray suggested that this moneyoe 
used to establish a scholarship fund for Iranian students in the United States, 
after the model of the Boxer Rebellion indemnity. The State Department 
announced that this would be done, but the fund was never established.24 
The United States also insisted that Imbrie's body be treated with full military 
honors en route out of the country. American authorities accompanied the body 
to ensure that Iranian Army and civil officials paid proper respects to Imbrie's 
. 25 
remams. 
At the time this occ).lrred, U.S. officials privately expressed the opinion that 
Iran was lucky that it had been the American consul who had been killed and 
not the British· consul. British reaction, Americans assumed, would have been 
much harsher. They seemed to be proved wrong, however, when on October 27, 
1924, a British subject named Cox, an "ex-NCO of the Somersets and of the 
South Persia Rifles, who settled down in Shiraz after his demobilization as a 
garage proprietor," was killed on the Shiraz-Bushire road by Iranian Gendarmes 
under circumstances suggesting murder. Britain, concerned with larger questions 
of security in the oil fields, raised no protest26 
RECENT IRANIAN HISTORY 
Although this episode has mostly faded from Iranian and American con-
ciousness, it appears to have been of importance both in Iranian history and in 
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the history of American relations with Iran. Imbrie was caught in civil violence 
whose origins were very old. 
Since the Safavid dynasty had transformed Iran into a Shici state in the 
sixteenth century, Iranian public consciousness had largely identified Iran with 
Shici Islam.27 Some Shici theologians saw secular authority as a usurpation from 
the legitimate authority of the hidden Imam. In Qajar times (since the early 
nineteenth century) the ulama had gradually put themselves forward as the 
protectors of the people against the tyranny of the shahs and of other secular 
authorities. This clerical-civil rivalry, along with hostility toward foreign influ-
ence, had been a major component in the development of the Iranian revolu-
tionary movement, notably in the Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892 and in the 
Constitutional period of 1905-1911. The clergy expressed hostility toward for-
eign influence, which seemed to dominate the shahs, and they succeeded in 
mobilizing mass support behind national ideas. The British tobacco monopoly 
was quashed by Nasir aI-Din Shah and a Constitution was accepted by Muzaffar 
aI-Din Shah largely due to clerically supported mass urban demonstrations, 
against which the government was powerless.28 
The reality of increasing foreign control could not be countered by Iranian 
clerical action, and during the First World War, Iran was a battlefield for 
Turkish, Russian, British, and German forces. After the war only the British 
remained, and in 1919 London attempted to impose a protectorate. Iranian 
public opinion was extremely hostile, however, and the Iranian parliament 
(Majlis) refused to ratify the treaty.29 
," 
EARLY IRANIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
Other than the Protestant missionaries who had established schools and 
hospitals a half-century before the United States actually established diplomatic 
relations with Iran, there was little American interest in Iran before World War 
II.30 Iran, however, was interested in relations with America. Since the early 
nineteenth century, Iranian foreign policy had been dominated by the reality of 
the imperialist threats from Russia and from Britain, and since the Napoleonic 
wars Iran had sought to balance the power of these two imperialist rivals by 
drawing a third great power into the struggle. France, Germany, and the United 
States have been such third powers.3! 
During the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911) there were two 
private American involvements of consequence. Howard Baskerville, a young 
Princeton graduate and a teacher in the Presbyterian mission school in Tabriz, 
martyred himself for the Iranian Constitutional cause, dying in the defense of 
besieged Tabriz.32 
On a more substantive level, the Majlis in 1911 hired Morgan Shuster to be 
Controller General of the Iranian Treasury. Although Shuster was engaged as a 
private citizen, he had been recommended by the State Department and his 
mission was therefore regarded as quasi-official by the Iranian revolutionaries. 
Within a few months Shuster's success at collecting taxes and regularizing the 
distribution of revenue had .(1) alienated large numbers of wealthy Iranians, 
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(2) given the Majlis hope that it would be able to organize the country 
financially, and (3) angered the Russians by using an anti-Russian British officer 
as head of the Treasury Gendarmerie to collect taxes in all of Iran, including the 
large sphere given to Russia in the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention. Supported 
by their British allies, the Russians demanded Shuster's resignation. He was 
forced out of Iran at the end of 1911.33 . 
After World War I, the United States again allowed itself to be drawn into 
Iranian affairs. In 1919, the State Department protested against British efforts to 
impose a protectorate.34 Perhaps because this was virtually Iran's only foreign 
diplomatic support, the Tehran government again turned to America. After 
Tehran refused the British financial advisors proposed in the abortive 1919 
treaty, the Iranian Minister in Washington, Husain Ala, suggested a renewal of 
the Shuster mission. Shuster himself refused reappointment, but on his advice in 
1922 Iran hired Arthur C. Millspaugh, the State Department's petroleum 
advisor. 35 Millspaugh was officially regarded by the State Department to be, a 
private citizen, but Iran viewed his mission as quasi-official. 
THE EMERGENCE OF REZA KHAN 
In 1921 a coup had brought the pro-British Zia aI-Din Tabatabai in as Prime 
Minister. The military force behind the coup was led by Cossack Colonel Reza 
Khan from British-occupied Qazvin. Many contemporary observers assumed 
that Britain, having failed to impose a protectorate, had found another way to 
dominate the Iranian government, in order to protect Britain's imperial intere'sts 
36 . ' in the south. 
Although Britain publicly maintained that the coup was not a British affair,37 
it seems to have been.38 Reza Khan had been personally selected by General 
Edmund Ironside, commander of British forces in Iran, to command the 
Cossack Brigade after its Russian officers had been removed by the British. 
Ironside encouraged Reza to seize control in Tehran, and the details of the affair 
were planned in coordination with Lieutenant Colonel H. Smyth, the British 
officer in charge of "the affairs ofthe Cossack Brigade, ,,39 and Walter Alexander 
Smart, the Oriental Secretary of the British Legation. The British Minister, 
Herman Cameron Norman, claimed to have had no advance knowledge of the 
coup. However, Norman had encouraged Smyth to send Reza with a troop of 
Cossacks to Tehran to replace the 600 unruly Cossacks already there.40 After the 
coup, Norman urged his government to support the new regime, which he 
characterized as being "hailed with utmost satisfaction .. _ as the most favourable 
to British interests which could possibly have arisen. ,,41 In his diary Ironside 
observed, "I fancy that everybody thinks' that I engineered the coup d'etat. I 
suppose I did, strictly speaking. ,,42 
There is no conclusive proof of higher British involvement, but the events have 
always encouraged Iranian belief that the British government was responsible for 
the coup. In this regard it is curious indeed that, within a short time and 
apparently on the explicit instructions of Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, three 
of the highest-ranking British officials in Iran-Norman, Councellor of Legation 
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Reginald Bridgeman, and Military Attache General W. E. R. Dickson-were all 
forced to retire. All three men had questioned Curzon's conduct of policy in 
Iran. Dickson in particular had publicly made known his disapproval of British 
involvement in the coup. All three men were quickly removed from the scene.43 
The continuing policy debate over Iran at the Foreign Office and in the Tehran 
Legation strongly suggests, however, that the British goverillnent had no clear 
policy toward Iran in 1921. Not until Reza had disposed of all significant rivals 
to power in late 1924 did the Foreign Office decide to deal with him 
. 11 44 uneqUlvoca y. 
After the coup, Reza Khan rose to dominate Iran. He became successively 
Commander of the Armed Forces (Sardar Sepah), Minister of War, Prime 
Minister (in 1923), and Shah (in 1925). He eliminated rivals from positions of 
power; Zia and many other early associates were forced into exile, or worse. He 
suppressed rival military forces: The Gendarmerie was merged with the Cossacks 
into a ~ew Army, rival nationalist leaders were subdued, and the independence 
of the tribes was crushed. Reza's dependence on British money was lessened by 
the engagement of an American financial mission under Arthur C. Millspaugh, 
which collected taxes, restructured the revenue system, and ensured the regular 
payment of government personnel. 45 
THE MILLSPAUGH MISSION 
During the early years of the Millspaugh ffilSSlOn (1922-1927), the United 
States became deeply involved in Iranian affairs. Millspaugh was arrogant,_ 
tactless, and pro-Pahlavi. As a critical Briton observed, "Dr. Millspaugh is, 
perhaps, no diplomat, nor does his report indicate any latent talent for literature. 
'The Americans have no political purposes whatsoever,' he says, yet he comes 
out openly in favor of Sardar Sepah as the only possible ruler of the country.,,46 
The American financial advisors nevertheless did regularize the collection of 
Iranian government revenue, and they did succeed in controlling government 
expenditure. This was achieved at great cost to Iran, however. In the words of 
British Charge Harold Nicolson, "The American Mission, while enriching the 
Persian Government, have impoverished Persia. The taxation levied is un-
economic; the purchasing power of the country has generally declined. ,,47 The 
success of Millspaugh's advice to the Iranian Treasury was essential to Reza 
Khan's consolidation of power, and the U.S. thus helped to lay the foundations 
of the Pahlavi Monarchy.48 
A FAILED REPUBLIC 
In his rise to power Reza made one major misstep. In March 1924, attempting 
to follow the model of Turkey, Reza tried to depose the Qajar dynasty and to 
create a republic with himself as president. He assumed that, because he had 
carefully supervised the Majlis elections, the Parliament would vote enabling 
legislation. Instead, he faced a determined clerical-led opposition: Sayyid Hasan 
Modarres, who had been imprisoned by Reza at the time of the 1921 coup, led 
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the resistance in the Majlis, and many mullahs in Tehran led mass demonstra_ 
tions against the republic. Reza capitulated. He withdrew the legislation from the 
Majlis, went to Qom to confer with the religious leaders, and announced his 
agreement that a republic was contrary to Islam.49 
In the next several months there were many suggestions that Reza had lost his 
grip and that he would soon be forced from office. The f-ollowing events stand 
out: 
I. The American-run Treasury took steps to restrict the amount of government 
revenue Reza Khan could spend on the army. Millspaugh had actually delivered an 
ultimatum on July 17, 1924. This potentially threatened Reza's monopoly of force within 
the government. 50 
2. Sheikh Khazal of Khuzistan, a notorious British protege and the chief military force 
in the oilcproducing province, began to talk of independence. Not only would the 
independence of "Arabistan" have been a blow to Iranian integrity, it would also have cut 
off oil revenues just as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was beginning to pay 
royalties.51 
3. Attempts faltered to break the British oil monopoly and to gain a massive American 
loan. A contract with Standard Oil for a concession in the north of Iran was destroyed by 
APOC insistence on a 50% share of Standard operations in Iran as the price for transit 
rights across the territory of the British concession (the entire southern two-thirds of the 
country). A contract with Sinclair Oil Company for a northern concession, which might 
have marketed Iranian oil through Soviet territory, was stalled in the Majlis. The election 
of Modarres as chairman of the Majlis Oil Commission suggested that Reza's opponents 
were in a position to deny him independent sources of revenue.52 
4. Mass demonstrations led by clergy denouncing the tyranny of the government ,were 
permitted in the streets of Tehran, unhindered by the army or the police. "Opinion in 
diplomatic circles here and among residents of experience is practically unanimous that 
Sardar Sepah's influence is waning," the British Legation reported on July 1, 1924. After 
Mir Zadeh Eshqi, an anti-Pahlavi poet and journalist, was murdered, 30,000 mourners (at 
a time when Tehran had only about 150,000 inhabitants) heard the Prime Minister 
denounced as "a murderer and assassin and the oppressor of the people. ,,53 The impotence 
of the government was noted in the press, and army officers chafed at Reza's weakness. 54 
In an attempt to divert popular opinion from its weakness, the government 
seems to have encouraged anti-Bahai violence. The Bahai faith, which began in 
Iran in the mid-nineteenth century, frequently had been the object of popular 
and governmental attack. Muslims believe the faith to be a heretical break-off 
from Islam, and consequently Bahais are not accorded the toleration allowed 
Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians. The Bahai faith has also converted many 
Muslims, which helps to account for the violence of clerical anti:-Bahai rhetoric; 
in Islam apostasy is forbidden and is punishable by death. Bahais also have been 
associated in the Iranian mind with foreign influence, in part because the Bahais 
were among the first to adopt Western styles of dress. The faith explicitly 
encourages scientific innovation. After the Bahai faith spread in the West, 
especially in America, there were many contacts between Western Bahais and 
their Iranian coreligionists. Bahais have been very prominent among the Iranian 
associates of foreigners, including Americans. For all these reasons Iranian 
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xenophobia has more than once taken the form of anti-Bahai rioting. Such 
violence was rampant in Tehran in the weeks before Imbrie was killed. 55 
Indeed, Imbrie himself observed and intervened in the rioting. He believed 
that the government was encouraging the anti-Bahai disturbances as a means of 
diverting public attention from its failures. In Imbrie's own words, "At every 
teahouse a Mullah harranged [sic] the crowd. Mobs, fired by oratory and 
hashish, swarmed through the streets, unhindered by the Police, crying against 
the Bahaists. ,,56 When two American Bahai medical missionaries (Susan 1. 
Moody, M.D., and Elizabeth H. Steward, R.N.) drew the attention of the 
crowds in mid-July, Imbrie requested police protection for them, which was 
quickly provided.57 There is no suggestion in the diplomatic record that in so 
doing he called fatal attention to himself, although a Bahai account now asserts 
that "any American in Iran was automatically assumed by the populace to be a 
Bahai. ,,58 Imbrie's curiosity thus having been piqued, his presence at the saqqa-
khaneh on the 18th does seem understandable, if reckless.59 
CONSOLIDATION OF PAHLAVI POWER 
Reza Khan used Imbrie's death as a pretext to take action that helped him to 
consolidate his power in Tehran. He immediately declared martial law and 
arrested his political opponents. Several opposition editors, who had escaped 
this dragnet because they had previously taken refuge (bast) in the Majlis to 
protest against alleged government complicity in the murder of Eshqi, openly 
accused Reza of using Imbrie's murder to cover illegal action. They suggested 
that Reza had plotted for violence against a foreigner so that foreign powers' 
would applaud his subsequent steps to strengthen contro1.60 Circumstantial 
evidence suggests that their accusation may have been well founded, for imme-
diately following Imbrie's murder the Iranian government muzzled the opposi-
tion press, stopped street demonstrations, strengthened discipline in the army, 
and curbed the clergy. Westerners applauded Reza Khan's restoration of order, 
explicitly rejecting any Islamic alternative to military justice.61 
Reza also took advantage of Imbrie's murder to bend Millspaugh and the 
American Treasury officials to his will. As the Imbrie dispute developed, 
Washington warned Millspaugh that "for the United States and for the Legation 
it is of paramount importance that adjustment regarding murder of Vice Consul 
Imbrie should be reached without delay. It is not the wish of the Department 
that the raising of any other question should become an obstacle to that 
adjustment.,,62 The United States thus implicitly encouraged Reza's dictatorship 
as a price that had to be paid for a satisfactory settlement of the Imbrie 
dispute.63 Following the intervention of the State Department, the American-run 
Iranian Treasury met Reza's minimum demands. 64 
The northern oil concession stalemate was not broken, however. According to 
official American sources, the Imbrie murder caused the termination of the 
Sinclair contract.65 That may be, but it is also true that the Teapot Dome 
scandal made it difficult for Sinclair to raise the Iranian loan that was a 
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condition of the contract, and that the Soviet government was no longer SUre 
that it wanted an American company extracting oil from Iranian territory 
adjacent to its borders.66 Furthermore, Iranian resistance to Sinclair's overtures 
also stiffened, as Reza's "recently increased autocratic methods" raised skepti-
cism in the Majlis "as to whether any advantages would re~lly accrue to the 
country were a loan to be negotiated.,,67 In any case, the U~S. government 
appeared more interested in asserting its prestige during the Imbrie dispute than 
in pursuing any specific interests. 
With the ending of the Iran-U.S. dispute by the execution of CAli and Husain 
on November 2, 1924, Reza was free to leave the capital city. He had support 
from the foreign legations, he had secured financing for the army, he had 
reestablished discipline in tll<: Cossack Brigade, and by executing Sayyid Husain-
a mullah-he had demonstrated his domination over the clergy. He left Tehran 
in early November in order to subdue Sheikh Khazal of Khuzistan. By destroy-
ing Khazal's autonomy, in the course of the next months' campaign, he com-
pleted the unification of Iran and ensured that his government would get all the 
APOC royalties.68 
From his triumph in the south, Reza went on pilgrimage to the Shici shrines at 
Najaf and Karbala in adjacent Iraq. One of the strengths of the Shici ulama in 
their rivalry with the Iranian Shahs had always been that, because their leaders 
resided in Iraq, they were beyond the temporal control of the Iranian govern-
ment. By making this pilgrimage, Reza emphasized that he had achieved 
complete control in Iran. By receiving him, the mujtahids and the British 
recognized his authority. Reza Khan consequently returned to Tehran)n tri-
umph: His control over Iran was complete, and the Peacock Throne was 
practically his for the taking.69 
While the Imbrie affair was not the only critical event in Reza's seizure of total 
power in Iran, it came at a critical moment in his rise. Reza may well have set in 
motion some of the forces that led to the fatal events of July 18, 1924; certainly 
he used the murder to his best advantage. 
IMBRIE AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN IRAN 
During the years immediately preceding Imbrie's murder there was an expan-
sion of American participation in Iranian affairs. The two abortive American oil 
concessions in the north of Iran were an important feature of this development. 
As the voluminous files on this matter in the American diplomatic archives 
suggest, had either of these proposals come into effect, there might have been a 
vast increase in American involvement in Iran, comparable, perhaps, to what 
occurred after the Second World War. There would have been, in any case, an 
immediate infusion of American money into Iranian government coffers. It is 
clear that Millspaugh and the U.S. government favored this development, a 
possibility postponed by Imbrie's death.70 
Circumstantial evidence suggests that Imbrie's assignment to Iran was a key 
part of this proposed expansion of America.n involvement. Assistance to com-
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mercial enterprises is a normal consular duty, of course, and Imbrie had assisted 
in the negotiation of the Chester concession in Turkey. Further, the Sinclair 
proposal was based on cooperation with the Soviet Union, and Imbrie was a 
Soviet expert. In addition, Imbrie was on close terms with the Sinclair represen-
tative in Tehran, Ralph H. Soper (who some, including Mrs. Imbrie, believed to 
have been the intended victim of the mob). Finally, the termination of the 
concession project because of Imbrie's death suggests that his assignment to Iran 
had been important to the project: no Imbrie, no concession. 71 After 1924, 
American involvement was sharply reduced, with "American interests in 
Persia ... center[ed] largely around the activities of the Presbyterian Board of 
Foreign Missions." 72 
Imbrie's assignment to Iran also had marked the emergence of an American 
policy toward Iran that was concerned more with the Soviet Union than with 
Iran. Clearly Imbrie was a man obsessed by the Bolshevik threat, and the 
Department of State had sent him to an area bordering the Soviet Union in 
order to collect information about the Soviets. American policy in Iran, includ-
ing both the Millspaugh mission and the oil projects, favored the emergence of 
Reza Khan-in the hope that he would be able to stiffen Iranian resistance to 
Communist expansion. Secondarily the United States hoped that Reza would be 
able to safeguard the interests of the United States in Iran and encourage the 
development of a modern, Western-style economy and society.73 Motives were 
mixed, but American observations of Iran were skewed by a world view that 
increasingly saw events in the context of a great struggle with the Red menace. 
Imbrie's death temporarily reduced American involvement in Iran, but it did not 
change a view of the world that was to prevail when the United States next 
became enmeshed in Iranian affairs. . 
CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the nominal harshness of the American response to the Imbrie killing, 
the United States continued to support Reza Khan's consolidation of power. The 
United States wanted Iran to recognize its strength and majesty, which had been 
affronted by the murder of its consul. Only Reza seemed to be in a position to do 
this. The United States was extraordinarily restrained in its public acceptance of 
the official Iranian explanations of what had occurred.74 Notwithstanding an 
outward show of insistence that justice be done, the State Department in fact 
seemed most concerned to maintain American prestige (indeed, "justice" seems 
almost to have been a code word for "prestige" in State Department usage). 
The Department demanded that Millspaugh give way in his dispute with Reza 
over the amount of money available to the army,75 knowing that this would 
enable Reza to augment his power. "Whatever justice we obtain must come from 
him through his military courts," the Legation reasoned. 76 U.S. Charge Murray 
was quite clear, after meeting with Modarres, that Reza Khan was the only 
alternative to fanaticism led by a "senile old man.,,77 Suspecting that Reza 
personally was responsible for the violence that had led to Imbrie's death~ as 
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Major Miles had reported after his investigation, the United States nevertheless 
approved Reza Khan's "desire to create a disciplined armed force in this country 
and not to be the commander of a horde of tribesmen. ,,78 Consequently, the 
United States acted as if Reza's regime was the best hope for American interests 
and prestige in Iran and effectively closed its consciousness to any possible 
Pahlavi complicity in the murder of a representative of· the United States 
government. 
The Imbrie affair also accelerated a 1924 United States policy shift in Iran 
from rivalry with Great Britain toward cooperation. After the war, the United 
States had opposed much of British policy in Iran, especially the proposed 
protectorate and the exclusive control of Iranian oil. In return, the British 
opposed the American oil initiatives. There had been a real Anglo-American 
rivalry in Iran: The British Legation in Tehran believed that Murray "hardly 
takes the trouble to conceal his anglophobia.,,79 On reflection, British Minister 
Sir Percy Loraine considered the entire U.S. Legation to be "very nervous of 
being thought pro-British." Loraine feared that independent American involve-
ment in Iran might give Iran '~another fatal chance of playing off one Great 
Power against another, perhaps even of embroiling them .... Anglo-American 
cooperation might save Persia from herself and from Russia," he continued, but 
"Anglo-American rivalry destroys [the] last hope of salvation. ,,80 
After the murder of Imbrie, however, American policy in Iran moved closely 
into alignment with that of Great Britain. American unwillingness to accept 
Modarres as a legitimate leader of Iranian opinion, for example, echoed the 
British judgment: "The Mujtahid Mudarres," wrote British Charge ~smond 
Ovey, is "a bigoted and unwashed Sayyid, the Diogenes of the Majlis, who lives 
in a hovel and ostentatiously refuses money for himself. ,,81 As British Assistant 
Undersecretary William G. Tyrrell put it on November 12, 1924, "America is 
being educated in Eastern matters-which is to the good-especially as regards 
ourselves.,,82 In Iran after 1924, U.S. policy usually deferred to a British lead. 
One of the worst-founded conclusions drawn by the United States from the 
Imbrie affair was the confirmation it perceived for its prejudices about Iran (and 
other parts of "the Orient"). Iranians were expected to lie. According to Elgin 
Groseclose, "approbation of deceit permeates Persian literature." 83 James 
Morier's Hajji Baba,84 which glorified roguish behavior, was a major source for 
Americans in Iran-it may have been Imbrie's most significant training for his 
last post. Murray believed that "the Persian is venal. His promises and lip service 
can be bought for a song. ,,85 Dulles expressed the belief, in a memorandum for 
Secretary of State Hughes and Undersecretary Grew on October 18, 1924, that 
"Morteza's execution was intended more to be a sop to this government than a 
real effort to execute a guilty person," and therefore he pressed for more 
executions.86 It did not matter that CAli and Husain were young, according to an 
unsigned NEA memorandum, because "human life as such is not greatly valued 
by orientals.,,87 
This widely believed cliche is a species of self-fulfilling prophecy. By categoriz-
ing the residents of Iran as "orientals" who do not value "human life as such," 
the men of the State Department were asserting that Iranians were lesser 
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creatures, fit to be manipulated and brutalized.88 Such an ethnocentric basis for 
observing Iran may have seriously skewed American perceptions of reality and 
provided an unrealistic basis for American foreign policy. 
The Imbrie affair also may have seriously skewed Iran's perception of the 
United States. The American response to Imbrie's murder was intended to make 
Iran see that the United States of America was powerful and majestic, that the 
United States insisted on justice, and that justice had to be swift and harsh. As 
Allen Dulles put it to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 12, 
1926, "When you are dealing with a government like Persia ... if you ask them 
to execute a Moslem for the death of a Christian ... if they do it, you 
accomplish more for the prestige of your country than if they paid a million. ,,89 
What Iran perceived may have been quite different. Despite strong evidence of 
high-level military involvement in the riot that led to Imbrie's death, the United 
States did not insist on punishment of high-ranking officers, nor did it distance 
itself from a prime minister who also had been implicated. Some enlisted men 
were punished harshly, but incompetent and culpable officers were hardly 
reprimanded. Some were even promoted. The United States had reason to be 
critical of Reza, but it chose to see in him the only possible source of "justice." 
Similarly, the only civilians punished were very young. Of course the United 
States took care to ensure that both of the condemned boys had passed puberty 
and that there was no serious reason in Muslim law why they should not be 
killed. 90 Still, the United States insisted on the shooting of two boys, aged 14 and 
17, on the action of a court-martial conducted by officers who had failed to 
prevent the murder of Imbrie by men under their command. The executions of . 
CAli and Husain were just as much sops to U.S. opinion as had been that of' • 
Mortaza. Under these circumstances, Iran reasonably could conclude that the 
United States, although a great power, could be manipulated, and that, despite 
sanctimonious talk about justice, the United States winked at abuse of power. 
Iranian-American relations were relatively quiescent after 1924, until the 
Second World War again brought the U.S. into Iranian affairs. When the United 
States and Iran then became vitally concerned with each other, their mutual 
understandings and misunderstandings-based in part on the Imbrie affair-
would form the basis for their subsequent relations. The Imbrie episode alone 
did not set the pattern for future American relations with Iran, but it sharply 
illustrates patterns that already existed, patterns that were reinforced in 1924, 
and that were to be very important after 1941. In its view of Iran, America 
supported Pahlavi militarism; it refused to see the ShiCj clergy as legitimate 
leaders of Iranian national opinion, it was preoccupied by concern with Soviet 
intentions, and it was increasingly willing to defer to British views and experi-
ence. In retrospect, these patterns do not seem to have provided a sound 
foundation for a healthy American relationship with Iran. 
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